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The eurozone crisis has made reforming the EU’s institutional framework an urgent priority.
Based on a recent speech to the Federal Trust, Andrew Duff MEP argues that without
revision of the EU’s treaties to create a fiscal union, the EU’s very survival is now in
jeopardy. He advocates the merging of the two EU treaties into one Fundamental Law of the
EU, and the creation of a federal economic government for the fiscal union. 
Reluctance to embark on the complex and serious business of  EU treaty ref orm is
perf ectly understandable. Many are intimidated by the relative f ailure of  the last big ef f ort
to develop the Union along more f ederal lines, which started in 2001 at Laeken but stumbled in the
humiliation of  the French and Dutch ref erendums in 2005. We can surely do better this t ime. The scale of
the present crisis changes the context in which this latest constitutional exercise is carried out as well as
providing the occasion f or it.
Treaty revision is inescapable if  the Union is to prosper. A new treaty is badly needed to mark the
important new stage in European integration in which the eurozone is transf ormed into a f iscal union. To
f ail to make this transf ormation jeopardises the EU’s very survival. Not only is it not possible to do
enough under the present treaties to salvage the euro, the present treaties are being stretched to
breaking point by the welter of  crisis management measures. The European Council, f or instance, has no
legit imate authority to impose on Greece or Portugal tax rises and wage cuts. While such a situation
might be tolerable on the grounds of  expediency in the very short term, there will soon be a serious
reaction in the markets and in the courts, to say nothing of  on the streets, if  nothing is done to
regularise af f airs and to restore the democratic rule of  law.
The treaty amendment process will start with a Convention,
opening probably in February 2015, will continue with an
Intergovernmental Conf erence in 2016 and will conclude with
ratif ication by all 28 member states of  the Union according to
their own constitutional requirements in 2017. In several
countries, not least the UK, either those constitutional
requirements or polit ical expediency means holding a
ref erendum.
How successf ul this constitutional exercise will be depends to
some extent on the quality of  its preparation. The EU
institutions will play their part – although the European
Commission plans not to present its proposals f or treaty
change until spring 2014 (too late to inf luence the European
Parliamentary elections); and the European Council has
decided woef ully to put of f  real discussion of  these issues
until December that year once a new EU leadership is in place.
Moreover, no group of  ref lection of  the kind which prepared
the Laeken Declaration is f oreseen. The polit ical agenda in
2013, it seems, is to be devoted only to the re-election of  the
German Bundestag.
So it is high time that the f ederalist movement got down to
draf ting a new constitutional treaty f or a f ederal European
Union. Nobody else will do it. Only the f ederalists can bring radical f resh thinking to answering the
question of  how a more united Europe should best be governed.
Form, structure, tone and terminology 
For the sake of  argument, let us call our new constitutional treaty the Fundamental Law of the European
Union. Merging the current two Treaties on European Union and on the Functioning of  the European
Union into one document allows us to substantially shorten the whole by reducing repetit ion and
eliminating duplication (f or instance, by having only one preamble). In this way too we reverse some of
the obf uscation which was at the time deemed necessary in order to turn the 2003 Treaty establishing a
Constitution f or Europe into the 2007 Treaty of  Lisbon.
We should indicate theref ore some reordering of  articles – f or example, the unit ing of  all the relevant
articles concerned with the international policies of  the Union into one chapter. In a similar vein, the
articles on categories and areas of  Union competence should be shif ted to f ollow the provision on the
principle of  competence conf erral. More of  this logical structural amendment can usef ully be done, not
least with the institutional provisions, to bestow greater simplicity and clarity on the question of  ‘who
does what’.
In view of  the distinctly more f ederal character of  the Union, ‘Member States’ become ‘States’ and
‘national Parliaments’ become ‘State Parliaments’. And the rather non-f ederal (because over-centralising)
‘ever closer union’ becomes, indeed, ‘f ederal union’.
We need a more self -conf ident tone and less clunky text than that arrived at in the later treaty revisions.
The excessively nervous checks on the powers of  the European Commission, European Parliament and
European Court of  Justice should be dispelled. The number of  dif f erent types of  decision-making
procedure should be reduced, getting rid of  passerelles, emergency brakes and automatic accelerators ‑
clever devices which may or may not have been intended ever to be used but the inclusion of  which in the
Lisbon treaty has led in practice to nervosity. This t ime, we invite the states to commit themselves
without equivocation to stronger f ederal institutions which will be more overtly polit ical and less
of f iciously bureaucratic. We need to enhance the capacity of  the Union to act in any given f ield, lif t ing
certain prohibit ions on the harmonisation of  national laws. The Fundamental Law aims to be a durable
settlement to the business of  the governance of  the Union, along with a clearer sense of  things to
come.
In the light of  our more permissive approach, the institutions, especially the Commission, will need to live
up to the assumption of  new governmental responsibilit ies. The necessary constitutional checks and
balances should ref lect more correctly then they do at present the principle of  the separation of  powers.
For example, we propose that if  the Parliament sacks the Commission, it itself  is dissolved and the MEPs
f ace new elections. And as the Commission becomes more of  a polit ical government, it should shed its
quasi- judicial powers, f or example in competit ion policy. The spirit of  Montesquieu will be gratif ied.
Substance  
Mindf ul of  the need to protect the integrity of  the corpus of  EU law, we need to make f airly minimal
amendments to the substance of  EU policy. The purpose of  the Fundamental Law, af ter all, is to
establish a better f ramework of  European governance inside which governors and law makers can make
more ef f icacious choices about the f uture direction of  policy. At the same time, the new treaty must be
responsive to the imperative of  dealing with Europe’s contemporary challenges, not least the social
crisis. We may propose to enlarge the competence of  the Union over the choice of  energy supply, to
resurrect industrial policy and to upgrade public health.
The main purpose of  the exercise, however, is to install a discernible f ederal economic government of
the f iscal union. The precise balance between executive and legislative authority will be contested at the
Convention. But it is our conviction that it was the f ailure of  the Treaty of  Maastricht (1991) to erect a
serious polit ical pillar in the construct of  economic and monetary union that has led the single currency
to near disaster. That lack of  economic government was lef t unrectif ied by the subsequent Treaties of
Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2000) andLisbon: it must not be neglected again.
So, ‘common economic policy’ should replace the mere coordination of  national economic policies,
becoming a f ully- f ledged shared competence of  the Union run under the auspices of  an EU Treasury
Secretary. The new treaty must incorporate the essence of  last year ’s Fiscal Compact Treaty as well as
provide f or the European Stability Mechanism. It will also embrace the new supervisory powers of  the
European Central Bank and make other statutory adjustments to codif y the establishment of  the banking
union. It will permit the progressive mutualisation of  a portion of  sovereign debt.
Institutional reforms 
In terms of  institutional change, the Fundamental Law needs, f irst, to render the two chambers of  the
legislature more equal and, second, to transf er most of  the residual executive powers now held by the
Council to the Commission. Bearing in mind the need to streamline the governance of  the Union, we must
invite the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions to justif y their continued
existence.
In addition, I would:
restrict the legislative procedures to two, ordinary and special;
adjust the voting weights in the Council in f avour of  smaller states;
promote the President of  the Commission to the chair of  the European Council;
reduce the size of  the Commission to f if teen members, essentially picked by the President-elect;
introduce a pan-European constituency f or the election of  a certain number of  MEPs;
lif t the restrictions on the scope of  jurisdiction of  the Court of  Justice;
introduce a more democratic procedure f or seats and languages;
give Parliament the right of  consent to treaty changes and to enlargement.
There are two f urther ref orms of  major constitutional importance. The f irst concerns the method of
f uture treaty change. Whereas unanimity must be kept f or the decisions of  the Intergovernmental
Conf erence, the unanimously agreed revised treaty should be allowed to enter into f orce once ratif ied by
only f our f if ths of  the States (and the European Parliament). This more f lexible approach would bring the
EU into line with all other international organisations and f ederal states.
The second change f lows directly f rom the f irst. States cannot be f orced against their will to take the
f ederal leap. A new category of  associate membership would allow such states to move to an outer t ier,
keeping the Union’s values but reducing engagement in the Union’s polit ical tasks. Associate membership
would also cater f or the needs of  Norway and Switzerland, seeking to improve on their present
unsatisf actory arrangements; of  the Western Balkans, needf ul of  a long and stable phase of
preparation f or f ull membership; and f or third countries, choosing f or reasons of  their own not to join
the EU but desiring and deserving a permanent, structured relationship with it.
Such a Fundamental Law would strengthen the governance and cohesion of  the Union and bolster
democratic conf idence in our common endeavour to build a better Europe. Alternatives are hard to
envisage. The Union which emerges f rom its present dif f icult ies will not be the same as the Union which
went into them. So ‘more of  the same, but less’ – which seems to be the strategy of  the coalit ion
government in Britain – is not a realistic option. Better by f ar that the UK joins in the f ederal core, albeit
with t ime to catch up, than that it distances itself  f rom the f ederal project entirely. Doubtless Prime
Minister Cameron will address these issues squarely when he gets round to making his Speech.
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1. A European f ederal economic government is needed to run the f iscal union in the interests of
states and taxpayers. (8.8)
2. The UK’s European Union Act is a good example of  a bad law (8.3)
3. Hungary is sleepwalking into an authoritarian state. But the European Union is limited in the
pressure it is able to exert. (8.3)
